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ABSTRACT
U.S. farmers face difficult economic times in the 1980s as net
farm income declines, farm debt increases, and more farmers
are forced out of business each year. The trend is toward
fewer and larger farms. A corollary is that if the trend
continues, the family farm as it is known today will cease to
occupy a place in American agriculture.
Federal tax benefits have influenced the shift toward fewer
and larger farms. In the process, these tax breaks have
unintentionally hurt family farms. This thesis compares the
cash flows and investment decisions of two hypothetical farms,
one large and one small, under different assumptions of tax
policy. It demonstrates that present policy favors large
farms over small farms and favors capital-intensive farms over
less capital-intensive ones. Policy-makers should recognize
the impact of tax breaks on the trends in agriculture.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Alan Strout
Title: Senior Lecturer
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TAX BREAKS IN U.S. AGRICULTURE:
WHO BENEFITS, WHO LOSES?
1. -INTRODUCTION
The 1980's have ushered in another era of hard times in
U.S. agriculture--in a history of hard times interspersed with
golden years. Today, many family-sized farms, those with gross
annual incomes of between $40,000 and $100,000, that have been
profitable in the past are no longer able to compete in the
agricultural sector. High costs of doing business combined
with low commodity prices threaten the long-term viability of
many farms and ranches. Increasing numbers of farmers,
particularly those with small or average-sized farms, must
sell their businesses or declare bankruptcy because they
cannot generate enough income to cover their costs and pay
their debts.
Operations feeling the worst crunch seem to be farms who
expanded during the booming agricultural economy of the
1970's. They expanded by increasing debts and today find
those debts extremely difficult to service in the face of low
commodity prices.
If present trends continue, the place of the family farm
in agriculture will virtually disappear. This paper will
illustrate how federal tax policy is helping to make farming
more profitable for large farmers at the expense of small
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farmers. However, tax policy is only one of a myriad of
factors that determine the structure of agriculture. Section
1 of this paper reviews the recent history of U.S. agriculture
in the 1970's to set the stage for an understanding of how
existing tax policy can be seen as a continuation of
expansionary production policies of recent decades.
Section 2 will examine the question of why farmers
expanded their production and debt so rapidly in the 1970's,
along with evaluating historical features of agriculture so
that we can understand the 1980's in light of the past. In
particular, this section sets the stage for viewing existing
federal tax policy as a part of the doctrine of abundance, a
policy approach springing from the optimistic belief that
unlimited world demand exists for U.S. food and fiber. This
philosophy is out of step with reality, as excess U.S.
commodities pile up and overseas markets rely more heavily on
non-U.S. production.
Section 3 will describe the tax policy of the 1980's, and
treat it as an extension of the philosophy that we need to
develop markets, rather than control agricultural production,
to solve the historic problem of oversupply. Tax policy is
aimed at increasing agricultural production through tax breaks
that cheapen certain costs in agriculture--in particular,
those of capital items. This section will discuss how tax
breaks may lead to oversupply of agricultural goods and at the
same time may encourage farmers to increase their debts, thus
exacerbating the cost-price squeeze that farmers already face.
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Tax breaks may also cause inequities for small farmers in
comparison to large farmers because tax breaks give large
farmers disproportionate advantages. In addition, tax breaks
may encourage capital-intensive farming because the breaks are
aimed at capital items rather than labor or other inputs.
Section 4 will show that, based on representative income
tax returns, large farms in general enjoy greater tax savings
proportionately than do small farms. In addition, the more
capital-intensive the farm is, the greater tax benefits it
receives. In addition, as large farms invest more, they
produce more, and the resulting greater production drives down
the price for all farmers. In a competitive situation, large
farmers are better able to compete than small farmers because
the tax policy serves to lower their costs more than it does
for small farmers.
U.S. agriculture has historically been unstable:
increases in efficiency have cut the numbers of farmers
necessary to produce the commodities demanded by the country
and abroad. The numbers of farmers have been declining, and
farmers are a decreasing percentage of the U.S. population.
The increases in efficiency come with the greater use of
technology, making agriculture more capital-intensive over
time, so that one-third the hours of labor is necessary on
farms today compared with only 25 years ago (USDA, Economic
Research Service, Economic Indicators of the Farm Sector:
Production and Efficiency Statistics, annual).
Agriculture typically follows a "boom and bust" pattern,
7
or a series of good years followed by "dust bowl" years. This
cyclic pattern is partly a result of farming's dependence on
weather and partly due to economic conditions unique to
agriculture. After the profitable 1970's, the 1980's appear to
be another depressed time in agriculture, particularly for
family-sized farms. This paper will show how tax policy
contributes to hard times for small farmers.
8
Agricultural Counties, 1950
'--I.-
~1.
= Agricultural counties. (At lea.
20 percent of
income from farming.)
c Other counties.
Agricultural Counties, 1975-1977
Source: U.S. Census of
Agriculture 1950; 1978
9
Number and Average Size of Farms
Millions
7 r
61
5
4
3
2
1
0
Acres
700
600
500
"' 400
ion
300
yn - 200
100
.L 0
1920 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80
Sources: Average size of farms 1920-50 from 1964 Census of Agriculture.
All other data from Crop Reporting Board, USDA.
10
RESOURCES USED IN FARMING
PERCENT
60 i
0 '-
1950 1960 1970 1980
Source: The Structure of Agriculture, U.S.D.A.
11
40
20
FARM PRODUCTIVITY HAS RISEN
4)
C
AD
E
.20
o r-
-0
=0
(L
120
110
100
90
80
70
so
51 56 61 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82
m CROPS - Measured in volume produced
+ LIVESTOCK - Measured in lbs. marketed
Source: 1984 Fact Book of Agriculture, U.S.D.A.
12
As farmland went up in value, the ability to pay for it from crops was reduced.
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2.- RECENT HISTORY OF U.S. AGRICULTURE: THE 1970s
2.1.- Current Difficult Times
A shift in the structure of agriculture is occurring--a
shift that has been steady, but has reached newsworthy
proportions today, perhaps because it is finally affecting the
people seen as the bedrock of agriculture: the family
farmers. However, both public awareness and awareness of the
farmers themselves comes late; it may be that the concept of
U.S. agriculture as we know it, composed of family farmers,
and the policy guided at helping those farmers, is a distorted
vision of reality. Things have already changed, and the face
of agriculture is increasingly dominated by large corporate
farms.
U.S farmers are in serious economic condition today. As
shown below, debts are high and incomes low, meaning that
farmers are again caught in a cost-price squeeze. Table 1
reflects aggregate figures for U.S. farming. The debt to
asset ratio for all farms was 21.6% in 1984, making it the
highest since 1940, when it was 21.1%. At the same time,
income return as a percent of equity reflected an all-time low
of 0.5%, from a high in 1950 of 5.9%. 1984 net farm income in
constant 1967 dollars was at a record low of $5.4 billion. In
current dollars, net farm income has actually declined since
1981, while gross farm debt continues to rise (see Table 1).
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TABLE 1. FARM INCOME AND DEBT
Year Debt/Asset Income Net Farm Net Farm Gross
Ratio Return Income Income Farm Debt
(all farms) (% of (bil. (bil. (bil.
equity) 1967 $) current $) current $)
1940 21.1 3.4 10.7 4.5 8.7
1945 9.9 4.8 22.8 12.3 7.4
1950 10.6 5.9 18.9 13.6 11.2
1955 11.9 2.3 14.1 11.3 16.0
1960 13.0 2.7 13.0 11.5 22.5
1965 16.4 4.4 13.6 12.9 33.7
1970 18.1 3.5 12.4 14.4 48.9
1975 17.2 4.9 15.8 25.5 75.8
1980 17.0 1.3 8.6 21.2 154.9
1981 17.2 2.1 11.4 31.0 170.0
1982 19.2 1.3 7.7 22.3 188.5
1983 21.5 0.5 5.4 16.1 202.8
1984 21.6 na na na 201.0
(Sources: 1984 Agricultural Statistics, USDA
Economic Indicators of the Farm Sector, ERS, USDA)
Table 2 reflects the trends in farm size and importance
in terms of value of production: large farms' share of the
total market is growing rapidly, while the family farm class,
defined as producing between $40,000 and $100,000 gross income
per year, continues to fall. (Note: Table 2 is not adjusted
for inflation. However, when values are adjusted to constant
1967 dollars with a producers' price index, in 1982, farms
producing over $100,000 as measured in 1967 dollars made up
47.6% of total value of production).
Total farm debt in current dollars was $46.25 billion in
1970. In 1984 farm debt had grown to $201.0 billion, and the
largest single amount, $45 billion, was held by the family
farmer group (sales of $40,000 to $100,000). This group
comprised 16% of total farms, produced 17% of the value of
production, and held 22% of the farm debt. At the same time,
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the largest group, that with sales of $500,000 and over, made
up one percent of farmers, produced 34% of the total value of
production, and held 18% of the farm debt (USDA, ERS, Economic
Indicators of the Farm Sector, 1984). (See Table
TABLE 2. VALUES OF SALES BY ECONOMIC CLASS OF FARM
(in millions current $)
CLASS OF FARM
(Value of Farm
Products Sold) 1964 1 of Farts 1969 1 of Farms 1974 % of Farms 1978 1 of Farms 1982 % of Fares
less than
$2,500
$5,000
$10,000
$20,000
$40,000
$100,000
$2,500
$4,999
$9,9999
$19,999
$39,999
$99,999
or more
$100,000 $249,999
$250,000 $499,999
$500,000 or more
Total Farm Production
1,143
1,611
3,653
6,614
7,114
6,474
8,538
3.31
4.6%
10.4%
18.8%
20.2%
18.41
24.3%
35,147 100.0%
935
1,346
2,814
5,693
9,267
10,073
15,282
2.1%
3.0%
6.2%
12.5%
20.4%
22.2%
33.71
697
982
2,139
4,460
9,247
20,072
43,694
0.9%
1.2%
2.6%
5.51
11.4%
24.7%
53.8%
705
1,191
2,361
4,425
8,788
23,059
67,339
45,410 100.01 81,290 100.01 107,868
0.7%
1.1%
2.21
4.11
8.1%
21.4%
62.41
558
999
2,008
3,694
7,142
21,642
95,545
32,930
19,851
42,764
100.0% 131,589
(Source: U.S. Bureau of
Agriculture:
the Census, Census
1978 and 1982)
TABLE 3. TOTAL FARM DEBT (billion current
CLASS OF FARM
(Value of Farm
Products Sold) 1980 X Farms 1981 1 Farms 1982 I Farms 1983 I Farms 1984 1 Farms
$5,000
$9,999
$19,999
$39,999
$99,999
$199,999
$499,999
or more
8.5
5.2
7.5
12.1
34.4
30.4
27.6
29.2
5.51
3.41
4.8%
7.8%
22.21
19.61
17.81
18.9%
9.2
5.7
8.1
12.9
37.7
34.0
30.8
31.6
5.4%
3.4%
4.7%
7.6%
22.2%
20.01
18.1%
18.6%
9.8
6.3
9.8
14.1
42.1
38.3
34.8
34.6
5.2%
3.3%
4.7%
7.5%
22.3%
20.3%
18.4%
18.31
10.3
6.5
9.4
15.2
45.9
41.2
37.4
36.9
5.1%
3.21
4.6%
7.51
22.6%
20.31
18.4%
18.21
10.6
6.6
9.4
15.2
45.1
40.5
36.8
36.8
5.31
3.3%
4.7%
7.6%
22.4%
20.11
18.31
18.3%
154.9 100.01 170.0 100.0% 188.5 100.0% 202.8 100.0% 201.0 100.01
(Source: Economic Indicators of the Farm Sector:
Income and Balance Sheet StatstiJcs,1983)
16
3).
0.41
0.8%
1.5%
2.8%
5.4%
16.4%
72.6%
25.0%
15.1%
32.5%
100.0%
of
less than
$5,000
$10,000
$20,000
$40,000
$100,000
$200,000
$500,000
All Fares
2.2.- Background of Oversupply
Many factors contribute to the difficulty that farmers
face. This section will discuss certain institutional features
that affect trends in agriculture.
Agriculture has suffered from chronic overproduction.
Economists see the problem as excess production capacity: too
many resources produce too much product at a given level of
prices. According to economists Cochrane and Ryan (1976), the
underlying economic conditions which often contribute to
oversupply are:
1.- Technological innovation in agriculture that has
outdistanced innovation in other sectors of the economy,
thus leading to rapid increases in agricultural
productivity.
2.- The economic structure of the industry, in which for
the most part there are many producers, none of whom have
the power to influence market price through the sale of
their commodity.
3.- The aggregrate inelasticity of the demand for food,
meaning that the quantity of food demanded is relatively
fixed--a given population needs a certain amount of food,
and price has only a minor effect on demand.
4.- The difficulty of producers to shift in and out of
farming due to the great reliance on specialized, expensive
fixed capital (land and machinery), or what Samuelson
(1964) refers to as the aggregate inelasticity of supply in
agriculture.
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Therefore, when productivity increases as a result of
improved technology, farmers produce more with the same amount
of resources, price falls because supply outstrips demand, and
farm incomes fall. The result is an unstable economic
environment in which the long-term trend is toward fewer
farmers producing more output, as farmers less able to compete
are forced out of business.
2.3.- Expansion of Production in the 1970s
Federal agricultural policy has encouraged expansion.
For example, decades of government programs have been aimed at
expanding production through greater efficiency. In addition,
the system of price supports, primarily intended to stabilize
farm income, also serves to encourage greater production.
2.3.1.- Doctrine of Abundance
In the post-World War II period at least two dominant
ideologies governed the way people saw the farm problem. The
first, New Deal scarcity economics, arose from the desire to
avoid repeating the combination of huge crop surpluses and
accompanying low prices that existed during the Depression
(Matusow, 1970). Adherents of the concept believed in supply
management, or limiting supply, to offset the effects of
continued productivity increases arising from technological
improvement.
The second ideology, referred to as the doctrine of
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abundance, was based on the concept that it was not necessary
to limit output, that instead the answer was to ensure that
demand increased at least as fast as supply, thus maintaining
price levels (Matusow, 1970). Proponents looked primarily
toward expanding world markets for U.S. products.
Since the 1930's federal policy has followed a mix of the
two concepts, both supporting crop prices and attempting to
build world markets in order to control the cyclic swings of
scarcity/high prices and overproduction/low prices. However,
price supports alone, without effective controls on
production, only make the problem of overproduction worse.
The government has put price supports in place but has failed
to control production adequately.
In fact, in recent decades federal policy has held price
supports in place and simultaneously urged U.S. farmers to
increase production, aiming at the world market. During the
1970's in particular, farmers saw a bright future in expanding
overseas markets, leading to hopes that all excess U.S.
commodities would be demanded by world markets at good prices.
Domestic prices were high due to relatively low stockpiles of
crops, encouraging farmers to increase production.
2.3.2. - Increased Debt
Debt and expansion came into vogue for farmers, and large
numbers jumped on the bandwagon, shrugging off the fear of
debt instilled by the Depression years. U.S. farm policy again
subscribed to the doctrine of abundance; Secretary of
19
Agriculture Earl Butz exhorted farmers to "plant fencerow to
fencerow" to take advantage of the golden years ahead.
However, overseas demand for U.S. food products has not
materialized to the levels predicted by policy-makers in the
1970's (Avery, 1985). One reason is the strong dollar, making
U.S. exports expensive for other countries. Another is the
U.S. use of embargoes on agricultural exports to express its
position on political issues, as in the Russian wheat embargo,
with the effect of raising doubts as to the dependability of
supply of U.S. products. Most important is the recent
unforseen growth of productivity in Asia and Europe, in which
many countries have changed from net importers of agricultural
goods to net exporters.
In the early 1980's production reached high levels,
resulting in vast quantities of crops piling up in government
and private storage, and commodity prices began to fall (USDA,
1984). As people saw farming becoming less profitable, the
demand for land fell, and land prices dropped. However, the
economy of the 1970s had been built on the expectation that
land values would continue to rise, commodity prices would
remain high, and agricultural exports would reach record
levels (Farm Real Estate Market Developments, USDA, 1978).
Farmers who expanded their operations at that time paid all-
time high prices to purchase the land.
Thus, the current heavy farm debt is a legacy of the
optimistic outlook of the 1970s. During the early 1980s
farmers' borrowing capacity diminished as farmland values
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declined, forcing them to rely more heavily on returns from
current production to pay expenses (USDA, Farm Sector Review,
1983). Decreases in commodity prices in the 1980s make the
land debt very difficult to service.
Another factor that has affected the character of
agriculture is the Farm Credit System, the country's largest
agricultural lender. Federally chartered and specifically set
up to aid small farmers after the Depression, during the 1970s
the System's expansionary credit policies encouraged
substantial increases in farm debt. Today, because of the low
profits in agriculture and large debts undermined by falling
land prices, record numbers of Farm Credit banks are failing.
The bank closings contribute to the vicious cycle by reducing
credit availability to remaining farmers, and also by shifting
loanable funds to other more profitable sectors of the
economy.
Also, debt is the price of capital-intensification. Farm
policy and economic circumstances have encouraged farmers to
replace labor with capital, and debt is the consequence of
doing so.
The current high debt loads will likely result in greater
numbers of farms going out of business, especially from the
middle size stratum. Family farms are at a disadvantage
because they feel pressured to get bigger, yet may not be able
to handle the necessary debt that accompanies increase in
size. Many family-sized farms that have been profitable in the
past are not able to compete today. In fact, the firms now
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most at risk are some of the most efficient in the industry
but suffer a critical weakness: they hold an excessive amount
of debt as measured by the economic environment of the 1980s
(Harl, 1985).
Debt to asset ratios are increasing for all farms,
including large and small. Large farms hold the highest
debt/asset ratios but also reflect the highest returns. (See
Tables 4, 5, and 6.)
Trends that are appearing now are sharply higher
bankruptcy rates among farmers, difficulty in obtaining
credit, and record production causing low prices for crops and
livestock. The net result is low farm incomes and lack of
profitability.
The farmers best able to take advantage of technological
improvements, credit opportunities, and federal subsidies such
as large water projects, are large farmers or outside
investors who control large amounts of money (Villarejo,
1981). The trend is for large farms to get larger and for
wealth and production to be concentrated into the hands of a
smaller percentage of farmers.
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TABLE 4. DEBT TO ASSET RATIOS FOR ALL FARMS
CLASS OF FARM
(Value of Farm
Products Sold)
less than
$5,000
$10,000
$20,000
$40,000
$100,000
$200,000
$500,000
All farms
$5,000
$9,999
$19,999
$39,999
$99,999
$199,999
$499,999
or more
1980
12.4
11.8
12.7
12.8
15.2
16.7
19.9
30.4
17.0
1981
12.4
12.0
12.8
12.8
15.4
17.1
20.4
30.2
17.2
1982
13.9
13.3
14.4
14.4
17.3
19.1
22.6
32.4
19.2
1983
14.7
14.3
15.6
15.8
19.5
21.6
25.7
36.5
21.5
1984
15.1
14.6
15.7
15.9
19.4
21.5
27.0
36.6
21.6
(Source: Economic Indicators of the Farm Sector:
Income and Balance Sheet Statistics, 1983)
TABLE 5. TOTAL RECEIPTS PER DOLLAR OF CAPITAL
FOR DIFFERENT-SIZED FARMS
CLASS OF FARM
(Value of Farm
Products Sold) 1982
less than
$2,500
$10,000
$20,000
$25,000
$50,000
$100,000
$200,000
$250,000
$500,000
$2,500
$9,999
$19,999
$24,999
$39,999
$99,999
$199,999
$249,999
$499,999
or more
(Source: Economic Indicators of the Farm Sector:
Farm Sector Review, 1983)
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$0.01
$0.04
$0.06
$0.08
$0.09
$0.13
$0.16
$0.13
$0.15
$0.37
TOTAL 6. INCOME, EXPENSES AND RETURN FOR VARIOUS SIZED FARMS
CLASS OF FARM
(Value of Farm
Products Sold)
1980
Total Total Percent
Income Expense Return
1983
Total Total Percent
Income Expense Return
less than
$5,000
$10,000
$20,000
$40,000
$100,000
$200,000
$500,000
All Farms
$5,000
$9,999
$19,999
$39,999
$99,999
$199,999
$499,999
or more
2.4
2.7
4.6
8.8
26.9
26.4
25.9
41.5
4.9
3.7
5.4
9.3
26.0
23.7
22.1
29.1
139.2 124.2
(neg)
(neg)
(neg)
(neg)
3.3%
11.4%
17.2%
42.4%
2.4
2.9
4.6
9.0
27.8
26.7
25.7
39.8
5.2
3.9
5.6
9.6
27.3
24.9
23.3
30.0
12.1% 139.0 129.8
(Source: Economic Indicators of the Farm Sector:
Income and Balance Sheet Statistics, 1983)
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(neg)
(neg)
(neg)
(neg)
2.1%
7.2%
10.3%
32.4%
7.1%
3.- THE EFFECT OF 1980s TAX POLICY ON AGRICULTURE
3.1.- Description of Policy
Today U.S. agriculture is characterized by
overproduction, a subsidy program of price supports, and a
system of tax breaks that seems to favor large farms over
small ones and to encourage overinvestment in agriculture.
Just as federal farm policy has added to a chronic oversupply
of agricultural products, federal tax incentives may also be
adding to oversupply.
For purposes of this paper, tax breaks or benefits will
be defined as provisions of federal tax policy that offer an
income tax savings as a result of an agricultural operator's
decision to sell production or to purchase or sell capital
assets. Tax breaks work by allowing taxpayers to understate
their true incomes or to create artificial losses when true
economic losses do not exist.
Specifically, this paper examines the effects of the
investment tax credit and the more generous depreciation rules
known as accelerated cost recovery system (ACRS) provided for
in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. The 1981
legislation represented a striking acceleration in cost
recovery (Harl, 1985).
3.2.- Tax Policy: Encouraging Oversupply
Tax policy itself encourages debt and expansion, because
it encourages investment in capital items. Tax breaks
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encourage greater production of agricultural goods, when
farmers already face depressed prices caused by oversupply.
Second, tax policy also appears to give preference to large
producers over small. The tax breaks give competitive
advantages to farmers or investors in high income tax brackets
over those in low tax brackets. They also appear to aid
capital-intensive farms over less capital-intensive ones. As
a result of these influences, federal tax policy may be
unintentionally helping to speed the process by which family
farms are replaced by larger operations.
Excess production capacity causes low prices, thus
reducing farm profitability, particularly of small or average-
sized farms because they tend to have lower profit margins and
less risk-taking ability than larger farms. The outcome is
that the market squeezes out those least able to compete.
Proponents of neoclassical economic theory describe this
phenomenon as a normal functioning of the market, claiming
that equilibrium is reached when inefficient producers are
forced out.
However, this paper considers the situation of producers
who are being forced out not because they are inefficient, but
because they are unable to take advantage of benefits offered
by federal tax law, an institution outside of the market. Or,
rather than being inefficient, those marginal farmers being
forced out of business are those that don't have the
competitive advantage through tax benefits that larger farmers
do.
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U.S. federal tax policy encourages production by allowing
tax breaks to certain agricultural activities. The breaks
make investment in agriculture comparatively less costly than
investment in other productive sectors.
3.3.- Effect of Tax Policy on Small Farms
The following graphs illustrate the situation. Graph 1
represents the supply and demand schedules for agricultural
goods in general, with an equilibrium price and quantity of
production. Because federal tax breaks reduce the cost of
production, tax breaks essentially shift the supply curve out,
since producers can afford to produce more of a commodity at
that same price.
Q
GRAPH 1. EFFECT OF TAX BENEFITS ON AGGREGATE SUPPLY
AND DEMAND FOR AGRICULTURAL GOODS
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The result is that, assuming no change in demand, the
equilibrium price falls and the equilibrium quantity
increases. These changes in price and quantity also occur
when technological innovation increases, which leads to
increased supply and decreased price. But federal tax policy
is an institutional constraint, rather than a natural
functioning of the market, and its effects must be judged in
light of its policy aims. If the aim was to increase the
quantity of agricultural output and lower prices, then it has
accomplished its aims. But the argument must be carried one
step further to determine who is benefited by such government
action and who stands to lose; i.e., the equity question of
federal tax policy.
A simplistic assumption would be to say that the effect
of federal tax breaks on individual farmers is identical, that
they all face lower prices, but at the same time they all
enjoy lower costs of production due to tax savings resulting
from tax breaks. However, it appears that large farms, whose
owners are in higher tax brackets, enjoy a greater proportion
of the tax savings than do small farms. As a result, all
farms face the same drop in price, but small farms fail to
share equally in the reduced costs afforded by the tax breaks.
Graph 2 and 3, respectively, show the situations of a
small farm and a large farm, where the small farm's costs
remain the same or decline slightly as a result of tax breaks,
but the large farm's costs decline proportionately more (LATC:
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long-run average total cost). Therefore, the large farm's
gross income declines less than that of the small farm.
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GRAPH 2. EFFECT OF TAX GRAPH 3. EFFECT OF TAX
BENEFITS ON A SMALL FARM BENEFITS ON A LARGE FARM
Rather than the tax breaks aiding family farmers and
ranchers, the breaks instead benefit large farms and investors
in land and livestock who have sources of income outside of
agriculture. Simply put, the tax breaks are of little use to
a full-time farmer or rancher who typically makes little
taxable income. However, the breaks are of considerable value
to an operator who has a large taxable income, either from
farming or from sources outside of agriculture, because these
operators can take advantage of tax losses and avoid paying
appreciable income taxes. In effect, it costs investors and
large farmers less to produce the same commodity that a family
farm does, because they can take advantage of tax breaks.
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3.4.- Components of Federal Tax Policy
Following are the major tax benefits that affect
agricultural producers. These benefits carry different
implications based on whether a producer is in a high tax
bracket or a low one. There is also a cumulative effect when a
particular agricultural operation can take advantage of more
than one benefit at a time.
1.- The investment tax credit--10% of the purchase price of
capital goods can be written off as a direct tax credit,
meaning that, if sufficient taxes are owed, the actual cost
of the good is 90% of the stated purchase price.
2.- Accelerated depreciation--ordinarily, businesses
apportion capital expenditures as offsets to income on a
schedule that corresponds to the useful life of the item.
However, under accelerated depreciation, a business is
allowed to depreciate an item much faster than under, say,
straight line depreciation based on its useful life.
Accelerated depreciation is a strong incentive for
operators in a high tax bracket to invest in capital items,
because deductions are worth more the higher the tax
bracket.
3.- The capital gains provision--certain capital goods,
such as land and breeding livestock, are eligible for
capital gains consideration when sold. Instead of taxing
the profit from the sale of these items as ordinary income,
items eligible for capital gains are taxed on only 40% of
the difference between the cost and the sale price.
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Therefore, investment in land or breeding herds becomes
attractive, because investors can convert resources into a
capital gain rather than ordinary income, thus avoiding
taxes on 60% of the income.
4.- Cash accounting--agricultural producers are one of the
few groups of taxpayers allowed to use cash accounting
instead of accrual accounting. Cash accounting allows
farmers to write off expenses of a productive activity in
one year and receive income from that activity in a later
year. Therefore, even though a taxpayer has actually made
a profit, he can reduce his annual taxable income either by
purchasing items before the end of the year or by delaying
receipt of income until the next year. In effect, the
farmer receives an interest-free loan in the amount of
taxes not paid, because he can arbitrarily choose when he
receives income or pays expenses.
5.- The interest deduction--all interest costs can be
deducted directly from income. Since most farms borrow
money to purchase their most expensive items, which are
land and equipment, most of the initial payments is
interest. Therefore, the deduction encourages debt-funded
investment. And, taxpayers in high brackets receive a
greater benefit then those in lower brackets, such as a
small or beginning farmer, because the deductions are worth
more. An example of the combined effect of two of these
tax breaks is the following: expanding breeding herds gets
a special tax benefit thanks to both cash accounting and
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capital gains. The cost of raising breeding stock is
expensed, or subtracted directly from income. Then, at the
time of sale, the entire sale price is treated as a capital
gain and is 60% exempt from tax.
So, taxpayers using cash accounting deduct 100% of the
cost of raising a breeding or dairy animal but count only 40%
of its sale price as income. This can create losses for tax
purposes even from profitable operations. In addition, tax
law encourages producers to expand the size of breeding herds,
because income invested in raising breeding stock to add to
the herd is not taxed until sale of the herd. Therefore,
overproduction results.
TABLE 7. EFFECT OF CASH
GAINS ON HIGH AND
Tax Bracket
Cost of Producing a Stock Cow
Sale price when culled
Before-tax Loss (Production
Cost - Sale Price)
Tax Savings (Production costs
x tax bracket)
Taxes on sale of the Cull Cow
(Sale price x 40% x bracket)
Net tax Savings (Tax Savings
from deducting production
costs less taxes on sale)
Net After-tax profit or loss
(net tax savings less
before-tax loss)
(Source: Center for
ACCOUNTING AND CAPITAL
LOW BRACKET TAXPAYERS
20% 50%
$500 $500
$400 $400
($100) ($100)
$100
$32
$68
($32)
Rural Affairs,
$250
$80
$170
$70
1985)
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Both operations spend $500 to raise a stock cow and sell
it for $400 when culled, for a net before-tax loss of $100.
However, the 50% bracket taxpayer has a net tax savings of
$170.50; after taxes he makes $70. But the 20% bracket
taxpayer suffers an after-tax loss of $32 because his tax
savings are much lower.
In summary, tax breaks add to the expansionary trend of
agricultural production in the following ways:
1.- Subsidizing investment in capital items, thereby
encouraging capital-intensive expansion,
2.- Encouraging replacement of labor with capital, because
they make the cost of added capital relatively cheaper, thus
further increasing debt,
3.- Giving a greater advantage to large and more capital-
intensive farms than to smaller, less capital-intensive farms,
thus weighting the scales against small and, especially,
beginning farmers, and
4.- Encouraging increased farm debt, because debt is necessary
to fund the investment that the tax breaks encourage; greater
debt is the price farmers pay to take advantage of the tax
breaks. Greater debt leads to greater risk as the debt to
asset ratio increases in any business, and thus, greater
chances for failure and bankruptcy.
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4.- EFFECT OF TAX BREAKS ON SMALL AND LARGE FARMS
4.1.- The Hypothesis
This section tests the hypothesis that federal tax policy
may have inequitable effects on small farms compared to large
farms. The hypothesis is that the investment tax credit and
the accelerated cost recovery system benefit large farms more
than small, and that these two tax breaks give greater
benefits to farms that are more capital-intensive than other
farms. Therefore, tax breaks may be encouraging farms to
become larger and more capital-intensive. The attached
worksheets reflect use of a model to compare income, expenses,
investment, and before-and-after tax profitability of two
representative farms.
The model developed in this section provides a framework
to answer the following questions:
1.- Do accelerated depreciation and investment tax credits
provide an advantage to farmers over the alternative method
of straight-line depreciation?
2.- Do these two tax breaks give different proportional
benefits to different size classes of farms?
3.- Do these two tax breaks give differing benefits to
farms that are more capital-intensive than to farms that
are less capital-intensive?
4.2.- The Investment Tax Credit
The investment tax credit allows businesses a direct
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credit against tax owed of 10% of the purchase price of most
capital items. The ITC is a clear benefit to businesses
because it reduces the tax burden, not simply as another
before-tax expense, but as a direct and immediate credit
against taxes owed. As a result, it is worth considerably
more than other tax advantages that simply appear as increased
expenses for tax purposes.
4.3.- Accelerated Depreciation
Depreciation is figured using formulas based on the cost
of the capital expenditures. It is a non-cash expense and is
important only because it reduces taxable income. It does so
through producing a tax shield, which is defined as the taxes
not paid as a result of the depreciation allowed. The tax
shield is equal to the depreciation allowed multiplied by the
tax bracket. Therefore, the higher the tax bracket (and also,
the higher the depreciation), the less income tax is owed.
The tax shield is often treated as a cash inflow.
The Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS) rules for
depreciation that were legislated in 1981 allow businesses to
depreciate capital items more quickly than did the previous
tax rules, thereby reducing the tax burden to businesses.
Under ACRS, tangible property is depreciated over a three-
year, five-year, 10-year, 15-year, or 18-year recovery period,
depending on the type of property (IRS, 1984).
Under these provisions much of the depreciable real
property in a farm or ranch operation is recoverable over five
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years on an accelerated basis. Tile lines, fences, feeding
floors, paved drives, grain bins, silos, livestock confinement
facilities, outside power and light systems, and water
distribution systems are all depreciable as five year property
in addition to being eligible for 10 percent investment tax
credit. Before the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 became
effective, these assets were depreciated over periods of 10 to
30 years (Harl, 1985).
Most assets placed in service after December 31, 1980,
are depreciated using ACRS. These assets are known as
recovery property, and the taxpayer may expense, or deduct
directly against income, up to $5000 of the property (referred
to as a Section 179 expense). This property is also eligible
for the investment tax credit.
Before figuring the investment tax credit and the basis
for depreciation, the taxpayer must reduce the amount of the
investment by the amount of the Section 179 deduction. The
resulting figure, which is the adjusted investment on the
worksheet, is multiplied by 10% to arrive at the investment
tax credit. Next, the adjusted basis for depreciation is
figured by subtracting one-half the amount of the investment
tax credit from the adjusted investment.
4.4.- The Model
To analyze the tax effects on the basis of individual
farms, I constructed a model in which two farms are compared:
36
one a large farm and one a small farm. Four charts using the
basic model illustrate four different sets of conditions (see
Appendix 1). Chart I illustrates the first set of conditions.
They are that both the large farm and the small farm invest
the same percentage in capital items and in which ACRS and ITC
are used to figure tax shields. In Chart II both farms invest
the same proportion in capital items but tax shields are
figured using the straight line method. Chart III reflects the
condition that the large farm is more capital-intensive than
the small, and that ACRS and ITC are used. Finally, in Chart
IV the large farm is again more capital-intensive than the
small but straight line depreciation is used in place of ACRS
and the investment tax credit.
First, the model illustrates the before-tax net operating
income. Second, it shows the effect on taxable income of
depreciation and the investment tax credit. Next, it analyzes
the value of depreciation tax shields. Finally, it shows
after-tax net operating income, which includes the addition to
income of the present value of depreciation tax shields.
Because depreciation allowances set up a schedule of
deductions each year, the present value of the depreciation is
the value today of the discounted flow of income arising from
those annual depreciation allowances.
The analysis is based on two 1984 federal income tax
returns, one of a large farm with gross income of $560,000
(operator #1) and one of a small farm with a gross income that
year of $80,000 (operator #2). Operator #1 represents large
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farms in higher tax brackets. Because the accepted definition
of a family farm is one that produces gross annual income of
between $40,000 and $100,000, operator #2 is representative of
a family farm.
Income
Operating
Capital I
Net Opera
Ratio of N
TABLE 8. BEFORE-TAX NET OPERATING INCOME,
HIGH AND LOW TAX BRACKET FARMS
Operator #1
$560,000
Expense ($404,000)
nvestment ($100,000)
ting Income (NOI) $156,000
OI to Current Investment 156%
Operator #2
$80,000
($57,700)
($14,300)
$22,300
156%
(Source: Appendix, Chart I.)
4.4.1.- Before-Tax Net Operating Income
To illustrate the before-tax cash flow of the two farms,
the table above is exerpted from Chart I in the appendix.
Gross annual income for farm #1 is $560,000 and $80,000 for
farm #2. Expenses are divided into operating expense and
capital investment. Operating expenses are approximately 72%
of gross income. Each farm spends the same proportion of total
expenditures on capital ($100,000 for farm 1 and $14,300 for
farm 2, each of which is approximately 20% of total
expenditures).
The before-tax cash flow is simply gross income less all
expenses. Net operating income is an arbitrary figure chosen
as a measure of a firm's well-being. It reflects income after
operating expenses only have been subtracted. Finally, the
38
ratio of net operating income to the current year's investment
is used as an indicator of profitability. In the table above,
the ratio is identical for both farms.
TABLE 9. DEPRECIATION TAX SHIELDS
Operator #1 Operator #2
PV of Dep. Tax Shield $33,002 $1,077
Section 179 Shield $2,100 $700
ITC $9,500 $930
TOTAL PV OF TAX SHIELDS $44,602 $2,707
Present Value of DPS $0.45 $0.19
per $1 of Investment
Marginal Tax Rate 42.0% 14.0%
Discount rate used 7% 7%
(Source: Appendix, Chart I.)
4.4.2. - Depreciation Tax Shields
The depreciation tax shields are the value to the
operator of receiving the tax breaks. The tax savings value
of one year's capital investment can be found by finding the
present value of the depreciation tax shields. This value is
found by discounting the five year flow of tax shields back to
the present (i.e., 1984). In Table 9 above, the present value
of the total tax shields arising from the $100,000 investment
by Operator #1 comes to $44,602. This figure comes from
multiplying the allowable depreciation amounts in each year by
the operator's marginal tax rate, then discounting those
amounts to the present.
An important measure of analysis is the value of the
depreciation tax shield per dollar of investment. This is
39
useful for a comparison of the effect of the tax breaks on the
two farms. The principal criterion for determining the effect
of tax breaks is the difference between the present value of
one year's tax shield that results from a large farm's capital
investment and that for a small farm. The differences suggest
that large farms receive a greater present value of
depreciation tax shields for each dollar invested than do
small farms.
TABLE 10. AFTER-TAX NET OPERATING INCOME
Operator #1
Net Operating Income $156,000
Less depreciation $95,250
Taxable income $60,750
Tax rate 25.5%
Tax $15,491
ITC $9,500
Tax Owed $5,991
Marginal Tax Rate 42.0%
After-tax NOI $90,480
Pres. Val. of DTS $44,602
After-tax profit $135,082
PV DTS/after-tax profit 33.0%
Ratio of after-tax profit 135.1%
to investment
(Source: Appendix 1, Chart I.)
Operator #2
$22,300
$13,835
$8,465
7.2%
$609
$930
$0
14.0%
$19,178
$2,707
$21,885
12.4%
153.0%
4.4.3.- After-Tax Net Operating Income
Using the marginal tax rate, after-tax net operating
income is derived from net operating income. To estimate an
after-tax measure of profit, the present value of the
depreciation tax shield from the current year's investment is
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added to the after-tax net operating income. From this point,
a relevant comparison is what percentage of after-tax profit
does the tax shield contribute. A differential percentage
reflects greater benefit to one operator over another.
Finally, the ratio of after-tax profit to investment provides
a comparison between the two farms.
4.5.- Assumptions
Capital-intensiveness is defined in a relative way for
purposes of this paper as the proportion of total expenses
that a firm spends on capital items. If a firm spends a
higher proportion of its total expenses on capital items than
does another firm, the first firm is defined as the more
capital-intensive of the two. It is also assumed that when a
firm is more capital-intensive, it spends a lesser proportion
of its total budget on labor inputs, thereby leaving total
expenses unchanged. An assumption is that large farms are more
capital-intensive than small.
For the sake of simplicity, all capital investment is
assumed to fall into the category of "five-year property"
under the ACRS tax rules.
It is assumed that the average useful life of the capital
items purchased is 10 years. Therefore, when the straight
line method of depreciation is employed, the value of the
depreciation tax shield must be discounted over 10 years,
compared with 5 years for accelerated depreciation.
It is assumed that the large farm is in a higher tax
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bracket than the small farm. It is also assumed that both of
the farms are organized as sole proprietorships andtherefore
subject to the individual tax rates. However, some evidence
suggests that more large farms than small incorporate, so
extending the analysis to all farms is tenuous. For example,
in 1982 corporate farms produced 34% of the value of farm
products sold but made up only 2.7% of all farms by number.
Individual or family farms produced 59% of the total value but
made up 86.9% of total farms (1982 Census of Agriculture).
4.6.- Results
Results in the four cases support the hypotheses that tax
breaks benefit large farmers over small, and capital-intensive
farms over less capital-intensive farms.
The first question posed in the previous section asked if
accelerated depreciation and the ITC give a larger advantage
to an operator than does the straight line method of
depreciation. In answer, we compare the large farm in Chart I
under ACRS and ITC with the large farm in Chart II under
straight line depreciation. We find that the new tax rules
yield a $.45 return measured in present value of depreciation
tax shields per dollar of investment, while the old rules
yield a $.27 return for the same investment. Thus, the new
rules clearly yield an advantage over the old rules. A
similar relationship exists when we compare the value of the
tax shields to the small operator under both sets of tax
rules.
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In addition, the after-tax profit of the large farm in
Chart I was $135,082, compared with after-tax profit of
$123,410 for the large farm in Chart II, leading to the
conclusion that ACRS and ITC are worth more to producers than
the straight-line method.
When weask, "Are large and small farms treated equally
under the ACRS and ITC rules?", we compare the value of the
depreciation tax shields to each operator in Chart I alone.
The value of the shields per dollar of investment is $.45 to
the larger operator and only $.19 to the small operator. In
other words, the present value of the tax shields ($44,602 for
the large farm versus $2,707 for the small) is 16 times
greater for the large farm than for the small farm, even
though the large farm is only seven times as large as the
small farm. Clearly, ACRS and ITC reward the large farmer more
than the small farmer.
The third point is to ask whether the new tax rules give
greater benefits to capital-intensive versus less capital-
intensive farms. We can compare the large farm in Chart I with
the large farm in Chart III, since the only difference is that
of capital expenditures. We find that the value of the
depreciation tax shield per dollar of investment by the more
capital-intensive farm is $.45, and the value to the less
capital-intensive farm is the same at $.45. Therefore, there
is no difference when analyzing the question through use of
depreciation tax shields.
However, when we look at after-tax operating profit, we
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find that it is $176,178 in the more capital-intensive
operation and only $135,082 in the less capital-intensive
farm. In addition, the present value of the depreciation tax
shields contributes 35.5% of the after-tax profit for the
former compared to 33.0% of the less capital-intensive
operation. Therefore, while the value per dollar of
investment is the same, the added volume of capital investment
results in greater profit for the operation that is more
capital-intensive.
These simplified examples of two farms of different sizes
and capitalization illustrate that the present tax rules
provide incentives for investors in agriculture to become
larger and more capital-intensive.
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5.- CONCLUSION
The U.S. has historically supported the concept of the
family farm, believing that it formed the bedrock for stable
agricultural communities that revolve around a farming system
composed of many family-owned farms. Ironically, however,
while federal tax policy pays lip service to helping the
family farm, it may actually be helping to put it out of
business. Tax breaks such as the investment tax credit and
accelerated depreciation clearly work to the advantage of
large capital-intensive farms over small farms. In addition,
tax breaks make the historical problem of oversupply worse.
Other sources also indicate that large farms tend to
incorporate, which would decrease the tax rate because the
maximum corporate rate is lower than the maximum individual
rate (Hassebrook, 1985). Nevertheless, even if they do
incorporate, such large farms still receive tax incentives
that are greater than those of small farms because the
corporate tax rate is higher than that for small farms.
The income tax is progressive, so operations with a
higher absolute amount of profit are taxed at a higher rate
than small ones, meaning that the small operators are
benefited by the tax rate itself. However, a progressive tax
structure combined with tax breaks influences who will do
further investing. For every dollar of investment, the
operator receives a depreciation tax shield in the amount of
the depreciation times his tax rate. Large farms get
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proportionately larger tax breaks, so their true investment
cost is relatively less than for small farms.
Serious implications exist for the future. The small
farm category often contains young and beginning farmers, who
are less well-established and probably have a larger debt load
and lower profitability than larger farms, and therefore lower
tax bracket, so they can't use the tax breaks as well as the
large farms. Even though large farms show up as the most
heavily leveraged (highest debt/asset ratio), they are most
likely in a higher tax bracket, so real cost of debt is not as
high to them as it is to the small or beginning farmer who is
also heavily leveraged.
As more farmers go out of business, the vicious circle
continues:
-- land ownership is consolidated in the hands of a few
-- even if the displaced farmers remain in agriculture as
tenant farmers, a shift has still occurred: principally,
that ownership has been consolidated.
-- production is concentrated in the hands of a few (and it
is a top-heavy, capital-intensive, mode of production at
that)
-- rural communities will undergo further breakdown, as
farms consolidate: owners of larger farms bank in larger
urban centers instead of many farmers banking at small
banks in their own communities. Implement dealers,
fertilizer dealers, and other service industries go out of
business in the small towns. In addition, it is possible
46
that larger consolidated farms use machinery more
efficiently, demanding fewer but larger pieces of equipment
than the many small farms of the past. This would cause a
shift in demand for machinery. So, while there still might
be production and farming and people, the nature of
agriculture in that area will change dramatically.
Family farms are worth maintaining. Contrary to the
popular assumption that large farms are more efficient than
small farms, some studies suggest that small farms are
actually more efficient (Raup, 1984). Many medium-sized farms
that support a diverse and stable system of rural communities
still makes economic sense for this country, rather than
coming to depend on a few huge enterprises that have reached
the size they have primarily through attributes of size
itself.
More importantly, however, the entire fabric of rural
communities depends on small farms. Displaced people and
disrupted communities are a real concern--presently the
"heartland" of America is undergoing a wrenching change as a
result of the failing farm economy that includes bank
closings, farm implement dealer and other service industry
closings, along with the shift in land ownership and control,
toward fewer owners of larger amounts of land and production.
The economic landscape and the farm picture in the U.S.
are changing. Rather than simply attributing change to the
natural course of events, I believe we are obligated to
investigate the extent to which federal policies have dictated
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this change. Citizens and policy-makers must make a decision:
should they simply accept this change or adjust the policies
so that they conform to our perceptions of what the
agricultural economy should be. The future of a small-farm
agricultural economy rests on this decision.
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CHART I
2 Farms with same capital investment under the condition of investment taxcredit and accelerated depreciation
BEFRE-TAI NET UPERATING INC
Income
Operating Expense
Capital Investment
Net Operating income INOI)
Ratio of NO[ to Current Invesi
FIGURING DEPRECIATION AND IC
Investment
Section 179 Deduction
Adjusted Investment
ITC
Basis
Discount rate
Year
5-year ACRS schedule (1)
Depreciation
Depreciation Tax Shield
Investment
Section 179 Deduction
Adjusted Investment
ITC
Iasis
Discount rate
Year
5-year ACRS schedule (1
Depreciation
Depreciation Tax Shield
DEPRECIATION TAI SHIELDS
PV of Dep. Tax Shield
Section 179 Shield
ITC
TOTAL PY OF TAI SHIELDS
Present Value of DPS
per I1 of Investment
AFTER-TAI NET OPERATING INCOME
Net Operating Income
Less depreciation
Taxable income
Tax rate
Tax
ITC
Tax Owed
Marginal Tax Rate
After-tax NOI
Pres. Val. of ITS
After-tax profit
PV DTS/after-tax profit
Ratio of after-tax profit
to investment
Operator i Operator 12
560,000 90,000
1404,000) 157,7001
(100,0001 114,300)
156,000 22,300
1561 1561
Operator It
100,000
5,000
95,000
9,500
90,250
7
I 2
151 222
13,538 19,855
5,686 9,339
Operator 12
14,300
5,000
9,300
930
,9835
71
--Farm I is assumed to be 7 times as large as Farm 2
--Expenses are assumed to be 721 of gross income
--Capital investment of Farm I is 7 times as large as Farm 2
--Income less operating expense
--Net operating income divided bycapital investment
--Operators can expense up to 15,000 of current investment
--investment minus Section 179 deduction
--Investment tax credit a 101 of adjusted investment
--Adjusted investment minus one-half the iTC
--Low-risk 1984 discount rate
3 4 5
211 211 211
18,953 18,953 18,953
7,960 , 7,960 7,960
--percent ACRS depreciation allowed each year
--Basis multiplied by ACRS percent
--depreciation multiplied by marginal tax rate zDTS
1 2 3 4 5
151 221 211 211 211
1,325 1,944 1,855 1,955 1,855
186 272 260 260 260
Operator i1 Operator 12
33,002
2,100
9,500
44,602
60.45
156,000
95,250
60,750
25.51
15,491
9,500
5,991
42.01
90,480
44,602
135,082
33.01
135.11
1,077
700
930
2,707
10.19
22,300
13,835
8,465
7.22
609
930
0
--Present value of 5 years of depreciation
tax shields resulting from current year's investment
--Sec. 179 deduc. xmarg. tax rate (not discounted$
--taken in current year so not discounted
--Above 3 lines added together
--from above
--tot. depr. allowed in I yr., assume same cap. invest. ea. yr.
--net operating income sinus depreciation
--rate figured from 1984 IRS Tax Rate Schedules
--taxable income times tax rate
--Investment tax credit
--tax less investment tax credit a tax owed
14.01 - a change in tax divided by change in taxable income
19,178
2,707
21,65
12.41
153.01
--multiply net operating income by I minus the marg. tax rate
--present value of the depreciation tax shield, from above
--After-tax NOI plus present value of deprec. tax shield
--Pres. val. of deprec. tax shield as a I of after-tax profit
--After-tax profit divided by investment
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CHART lI
2 Fares with same capital investment with condition of straight-line depreciation
Investment
Useful Life lyearsi
Discount Rate
Depreciation Year
2
3
4
5
6
7
9
10
Operator 1i
100,000
10
71
Tax
Deprec. Shield
10,000
10,000
10,000
10,000
10,000
10,000
10,000
10,000
10,000
10,000
3,900
3,800
3,900
3,800
3,900
3,800
3,800
3,900
3,800
3,800
Operator 12
14,300
10
71
Tam
Deprec. Shield
1,430 200
1,430 200
1,430 200
1,430 200
1,430 200
1,430 200
1,430 200
1,430 200
1,430 200
1,430 200
--tax shield = deprec. times marginal tax rate
--no ITC or Section 179 deduction allowed
Total Depreciation
Depreciation Tat Shields
PY of Tax Shield arising from
current year's investment
PV Depr. Tax Shield per i
of Investment
AFTER-TAI NET OPERATING INCOME
Net Operating income
Less Depreciation
Taxable income
Tax Rate
Tax
Marginal Tax Rate
After-tan NOT
PV of Depr. Tax Shields
After-tax Profit
PV DITS/after-tax profit
Ratio of after-tax profit
to investment
100,000
39,000
26,690
90.27
156,000
(100,000)
56,000
24.41
13,664
39.01
96,720
26,690
123,410
21.61
123.41
14,300
2,002
1,406
$0.10
22,300
(14,300)
8,000
7.21
576
14.01
19,178
1,406
20,584
6.9?
143.91
--total deprec. allowed in one yr., assuming same capital
investment ach year
--total depreciation x marg. tax rate
--present value of tax shields, using 71 discount rate
--above line divided by current year's investment
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CHART III
Large fare more capital-intensive than small; under conditions of investment taxcredit and accelerated depreciation
EFORE-TAI NET OPERATING INCOME
Operator 1i Operator 12
Income
Operating Expense
Capital Investment
Net Operating Income (NO)
Ratio of NOI to Current Invest
560,000
1364,000)
1140,000)
196,000
1401
80,000
(57,700)
114,300)
22,300
1561
--Farm I is assumed tobe 7 times as large as Fare 2
--Expenses are assumed to be 721 of gross income
--Capital investment of Farm Iis 7 times as large as Farm 2
--Income less operating expense
--Net operating income divided by capital investment
FIGURING DEPRECIATION AND ITC
Investment
Section 179 Deduction
Adjusted Investment
ITC
oasis
Discount rate
Year
5-year ACRS schedule il
Depreciation
Depreciation Tax Shield
Investment
Section 179 Deduction
Adjusted Investment
ITC
Basis
Discount rate
Year
5-year ACRS schedule (11)
Depreciation
Depreciation Tax Shield
DEPRECIATION TAI SHIELDS
PV of Dep. Tax Shield
Section 179 Shield
ITC
TOTAL PV OF TAI SHIELDS
Present Value of DPS
per i of Investment
Operator I
140,000
5,000
135,000
13,500
128,250
71
I 2
151 22
19,239 28,215
--Operators can expense up to 15,000 of current investment
--Investment minus Section 179 deduction
--Investment taxcredit a 101 of adjusted investment
--Adjusted investment sinus one-half the ITC
--Low-risk 1984 discount rate
3
211
26,933
4 5
211 211 --percent ACRS depreciation allowed ach year
26,933 26,933 0 --Basis multiplied by ACRS percent
8,080 11,850 11,312 11,312 11,312 --depreciation multiplied by marginal tax rate a DTS
Operator 32
14,300
5,000
4,300
930
8,935
71
I 2 3 4
151 221 211 211
1,325 1,944 1,855 1,955
186 272 260 260
Operator 11 Operator 32
46,98
2,100
13,500
62,498
$0.45
1,077
700
930
2,707
$0.19
5
211
1,855
260
--Present value of 5 years of depreciation
tax shields resulting from current year's investment
--Sec. 179 deduc. xearg. tax rate (not discounted)
--taken in current year so not discounted
--Above 3 lines added together
AFTER-TAI NET OPERATING INCOME
Net Operating Income
Less depreciation
Taxable income
lax rate
Tax
ITC
Tax Owed
Marginal Tax Rate
After-tax NOI
Pres. Val. of DTS
After-tax profit
PY DTS/af tr-tax profit
Ratio of after-tax profit
to investment
196,000
133,250
62,750
26.01
16,315
13,500
2,915
42.01
113,690
62,499
176,179
35.51
125.81
22,300
13,835
8,465
7.21
609
930
0
--from above
--tot. depr. allowed in I yr., assume same cap. invest. ea. yr.
--net operating income sinus depreciation
--rate figured from 1984 IRS Tax Rate Schedules
--taxable income times tax rate
--Investment taxcredit
--tax less investment tax credit a tax owed
14.01 -- a change in tax divided by change in taxable income
19,178
2,707
21,5
12.41
153.01
--multiply net operating income by I minus the earg. tax rate
--present value of the depreciation tax shield, from above
--After-tax NOI plus present value of deprec. tax shield
--Pres. val. of deprec. tax shield as a I of after-tax profit
--After-tax profit divided by investment
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Large farm ore capital-intensive than small;
Investment
Useful Life (years)
Discount Rate
Depreciation Year
2
3
4
5
6
7
9
10
CHART IV
conditions of straight-line depreciation and no ITC
Operator I Operator 12
140,000 14,300
10 10
71 71
Tax Tax
Deprec. Shield Deprec. Shield
14,000
14,000
14,000
14,000
14,000
14,000
14,000
14,000
14,000
14,000
5,320
5,320
5,320
5,320
5,320
5,320
5,320
5,320
5,320
5,320
1,430
1,430
1,430
1,430
1,430
1,430
1,430
1,430
1,430
1,430
--tax shield a deprec. times marginal tax rate
--no ITC or Section 179 deduction allowed200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
Total Depreciation
Depreciation Tax Shields
PV of Tax Shield arising from
current year's investment
PV Depr. Tax Shield per i
of Investment
AFTER-TAI NET OPERATING INCOME
Net Operating Income
Less Depreciation
Taxable income
Tax Rate
Tax
Narginal Tax Rate
After-tax NOl
PV of Depr. Tax Shields
After-tax Profit
PV DTS/after-tax profit
Ratio of after-tax profit
to investment
140,000
53,200
37,365
10.27
196,000
(140,000)
56,000
24.41
13,664
38.01
121,520
37,365
159,885
23.51
i13.51
14,300, --total deprec. allowed in one yr., assuming same capital
investment ach year
2,002 --total depreciation x marg. tax rate
1,406
10.10
--present value of tax shields, using 71 discount rate
--above line divided by current year's investment
22,300
(14,300)
8,000
7.21
576
14.01
19,178
1,406
20,584
6.91
143.91
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